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The Cracks in the Russia-China Tandem  
Discussions on energy security and its geostrategic ramifications continue to be topical for a wide range of 
states and business stakeholders. For many foreign policymakers, Eurasia, in the first decade of this century, 
has become the focal point for evolving and future geopolitical strategies. 
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China, Russia and the United States are major global players who are seeking to bring Eurasia within their 
own individual spheres of influence. Local and international analysts have repeatedly questioned the 
significance of the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership which, to all intents and purposes, is attempting to 
counter an extension of U.S. influence in the Eurasia and other regions of the world. Though this alliance 
serves the purposes of both states, the competition between them, which runs alongside it, also raises 
serious political and economic questions and may have a counter effect on the development of the region. 
The economy is the most frequently cited as a potential flash point between Moscow and Beijing. In terms 
of geopolitics, the Russian Far East, a region bordering China, remains an eternal challenge for both 
countries. It can be readily observed that a silent siege is effectively taking place there, with over one million 
illegal Chinese immigrants having crossed the Russian-Chinese border in recent years. They work as 
laborers, farmers and petty traders, and the Russian local authorities seem unable to stop them, even being 
willing to turn a blind eye to their presence. 
This situation is hardly taken notice in Moscow. It seems that the Kremlin has a particular – and somewhat 
positive – view on what is going on: On the one hand, China offers Russia economic opportunities, and on 
the other, Russian growth over the last decade has been largely driven by massive exports of raw materials 
and other goods to China. Under such circumstances it is not difficult to understand why old suspicions and 
disputes are tactfully forgotten or purposefully ignored by the Kremlin. For its part, Beijing needs at the very 
least a reliable and convenient provider of energy supplies, as these are so essential in fueling its own 
continuing economic growth. China wants to become a superpower, but to achieve this it needs vast 
supplies of raw materials on the best available terms. Russia has both the energy resources and transport 
connections to be the obvious supplier if the terms are right, and this concern overrides those on issues 
which might cause an unnecessary dispute between the two states. 
Economic, military and territorial opportunities 
In 2011 the Russian press devoted much attention to various agreements which outline the deepening of 
economic and trade cooperation between Russia and China over the next five years. Forty such agreements 
were signed by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in the fall of 2011, including one on Russia’s involvement in 
the construction of a nuclear power plant at TianWan, and some 17 more major business and trade deals 
were signed in Beijing during President Putin’s three-day visit to China in June 2012.1 
Obviously, Russia is always seeking new markets in order to sustain its economy, which was seriously 
affected by the 2008 economic crisis. The signing of oil and gas supply agreements with China, the second 
largest energy consumer in the world, is a great boon for the Russian economy. Loans from Chinese banks 
to financial institutions in Russia, worth 500 million dollars in total (year?), are among other measures 
specified in the economic agreements between the two countries 
Overall trade between China and Russia increased from $10 billion per year to over $50 billion between 
2003 and 2009, with a target of $100 billion in 2015 and $200 billion by 2020. Even so, oil and gas still 
represent more than half of Russian exports to China. In June 2012 President Putin negotiated with Xi 
Jinping, who is expected to become the next Chinese president later this year, a long-awaited gas 
agreement that would allow Moscow to supply some 70 billion cubic meters (2472 billion cubic feet) of gas 
to its neighbour. Recent reports suggest that pricing disagreements are holding up the deal between Russia 
and China.2 Also, in 2009 the Kremlin agreed to underwrite the 25 billion dollars needed to build a pipeline 
from eastern Siberia to China in exchange for promises from officials in Beijing that they would buy oil from 
Russia for the next 20 years. 
Politics, an important dimension of Russian-Chinese relations, evoke different and contrasting viewpoints. 
The coming together of Beijing and Moscow was driven primarily by their shared desire to forge a strategic 
partnership aiming at countering America’s global supremacy and influence in Central and East Asia. The 
creation of a range of global and regional power centers is the chosen strategy to achieve this objective. 
This was illustrated by Chinese President Hu JinTao during his June 2009 visit to Moscow, when he said that 
his country is ready to deepen relations with Russia in order to accelerate the formation of a multipolar 
world order. 
Many experts believe, however, that Russia’s interest in China is more commercial than political. Others 
fear that Russia’s massive supplies of fuel and military equipment to China will contribute, intentionally or 
not, to creating an East Asian arms race between China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the last three 
countries being long-time allies of the United States. It is also argued in some quarters that Russia appears 
to be trying to emulate the Chinese political and economic model, as the latter has displayed impressive 
staying power in the midst of sudden economic crisis; it has shown that such a model actually works. 
Some Western analysts have noted that some elements of the Putin doctrine have been inspired by the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The good relationship between Putin’s United Russia and the CCP, to the 
detriment of the Russian Communists led by Gennadii Zyuganov, is often cited as evidence of some 
similarities between Russian and Chinese foreign policy doctrines. This viewpoint is shaky, as there are 
significant differences in the way ordinary Chinese and Russians perceive the two parties, which signify their 
divergent natures.  
While the CCP is seen in China as an institution guarding the interests of the country, the Russians see the 
party of Putin as a strange mix of the post-Soviet political elite and those who have sneakily enriched 
themselves since 1991 and need a safe haven. There are other major differences between the Russian and 
Chinese political regimes. The reforms which have transformed China into a market economy were more 
consistent and thoughtful than those of Yeltsin’s Russia. Also, the Chinese Communists continue to hold all 
the levers of power, especially in areas considered strategic. In Russia, President/Prime Minister Putin’s 
reforms have focused mainly on energy resources – other economic sectors remain largely in private hands 
– and were intended to create a facade behind which he replaced the undesirable oligarchs of the 2000-
2002 period with a new generation of quieter ones, who nevertheless still wield significant independent 
power. 
Another difference lies in the societal features of both countries. First, according to global indices, the level 
of corruption is much higher in Russia than in China, although the latter is ever more contending with this 
issue. Second, the investment climate in Russia is less hospitable and ownership rights are far from being 
considered a basic principle and respected in all Russian regions. Third, Russia has fallen behind China in 
terms of the infrastructure it can offer potential foreign investors and is suffering from a demographic and a 
public health crisis, two sicknesses which will intensify in the long run Russia’s economic and military 
decline. Fourth, on the bright side, Russia remains more open politically than China, as it has independent 
opposition parties, although most are at the Kremlin’s mercy. The prompt ending of the “rebellion” of the 
State Duma (which had accused United Russia of massive electoral fraud) after the October 2009 regional 
elections was, however, a reminder that parliamentary institutions have to remain under the presidential 
administration’s control. Also, in June 2012 the Russian lower house of parliament adopted a bill that raises 
fines 150-fold for holding unsanctioned demonstration, from the 5,000 rubles (around $150) to 300,000 
rubles3 (around $10,000) for participants and up 600,000 rubles for rally organizers.4 Fines for the organizers 
of protests that fail to comply with federal regulations on demonstrations shoot up from 50,000 rubles 
($1,160) to 1.5 million rubles ($48,000).5 These laws were passed to tighten the limits of democratic and 
street demonstration clearly showed that there is some limit to criticism and freedom of expression. 
The most obvious difference between the two countries is their attitude to the Internet. The Chinese 
government imposes strict censorship on the Internet – and all the media in general – while Russia has 
adopted a more liberal approach to the media, letting it become an important tool of information and 
communication, containing propaganda from all points on the political spectrum. 
Despite consistent cooperation in political and economic realms, the robustness of the Russia-China 
strategic partnership itself is also in question in some important respects. The fact that Moscow has for a 
long time demanded firm guarantees regarding the export of its fuel is not accidental. Russia’s economy has 
declined as a result of the 2008 economic crisis, but its mainstays are unstable due to other aggravating 
factors: the volatility of world oil prices and the reduced demand for fuel, in Europe in particular. Full 
recovery will be a slow process, since putting the Russian economy back on its feet would necessitate a 
comprehensive modernization program that is only possible by means of huge capital investment in all 
productive sectors and a broad reform of the judicial system. Russian firms, big or small, are in no position 
to make such investments. Meanwhile, China’s economy is huge and expanding rapidly. Its Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) has miraculously averaged 8% per annum over the last 30 years. In 2012 the Chinese 
economy is ten times larger than it was in 1980, with Chinese GDP reaching $5.9 trillion in 2011. Most 
experts believe that China’s economy must grow by at least 8% every year to create enough jobs to prevent 
social unrest. In February 2012 the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its latest forecast (World 
Economic Outlook) projected that China's economy will grow by 8.25% in 2012 and 8.75% in 2013. Thus, 
China is not heading for a hard landing in the mid-term and will remain a driving force of global growth in 
the coming years.. By comparison, until it develops a diversified and competitive economy and sustained 
economic growth thus resumes in non-energy sectors, Russia will have much to do to keep pace with 
China’s development. 
China, for its part, can afford to formulate strategies which downsize the level of Russian fuel imports. A 
quick look at the present situation shows that Russia’s fear of losing many potential energy contracts with 
China is well founded. In 2009 China took an 11% stake in KazMunaiGaz Exploration Production, a subsidiary 
of KazMunaiGaz group, for $949 million, thus increasing its influence in Central Asia’s energy market. This 
acquisition is part of a decade-long wave of Chinese investment abroad, especially in oil, mining and other 
kinds of natural resources. Moreover, Chinese companies have been extremely active on the northwest 
border with Kazakhstan, a very large but sparsely populated country. 
In September 2009 Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez also announced a partnership with China, worth $16 
billion, to exploit some of the richest iron ore and tar sands deposits (which may be a source of future oil 
production) near the Orinoco delta. Chavez didn’t give many details about the document, but said this 
investment would be made over a three-year period. Chinese companies involved in the Orinoco project are 
contracted to produce 450,000 barrels of oil per day for the state company Petróleos de Venezuela 
(PDVSA). However, also in September 2009 Caracas announced a similar agreement with a consortium of 
five Russian companies which will make a $20 billion investment in Venezuela over the next three years and 
gain the right to prospect in the Orinoco Delta as well. Russia has also mimicked China by increasing its 
involvement in oil fields on the African continent. 
Chinese oil companies are mostly interested in obtaining shares in major oil fields which are close to 
production stage, or at their late stages of development. The Chinese government seeks to ensure it has 
long term energy resources because over the next five years China’s economy will require in excess of 11 
million barrels of oil per day to prop up its growth, according to analysts. Chinese companies in Africa have 
embarked on a course of diversification, from construction projects and natural resources exploitation to 
projects in partnership with local African producers and financial institutions. China is thus vigorously 
competing with some of the biggest U.S. and European multinational corporations in the search for rare and 
indispensable resources, energy and otherwise, in the continent. 
Favouring a non-aggressive and a rather diplomatic form of strategy in negotiating with its economic 
partners, China is pursuing its global interests discreetly and pragmatically. For instance, it is competing in 
Eastern Europe not only with the U.S. and the European Union (EU) but also its ally, Russia (witness the 
huge loan China offered the Republic of Moldova and the non-refundable loan of half a million euros 
recently granted to Romania), a sign that the Asian giant wishes, if not world leadership, at least an 
expanded sphere of world influence. In these circumstances, although Russia has gained substantial profit 
from the export of military technology (China is its second largest sales market after India), China’s 
geopolitical ambitions and the powerful weapons it has been equipped with raise concerns among experts 
and surely give headaches to many strategists in Moscow. 
Another complication in Russian-Chinese relations is the accelerating modification of the ethnic composition 
of East and Far East Siberia resulting from illegal immigration from China, a trend seemingly difficult to halt. 
The scant attention paid to this issue by the Chinese authorities seems to suggest that they don’t really 
intend to address it in the near future. Moscow knows very well how much harm ethnic conflicts (the north 
Caucasus comes to mind here) can do to stability and doesn’t want new ones breaking out thousands of 
miles away from the capital. Another source of possible dispute is China’s violation of environmental norms 
in the Khabarovsk region. Russian local authorities are multiplying their calls for more respect for regional 
ecosystems. These concerns, however, will remain in the background for as long as economic interests 
prevail. 
Essentially, the way Russia relates to the EU and U.S. hinges on the influence it wields as an effective leader 
within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and particularly in East Asia. But the same holds true of 
China, which is also a member of the SCO. It’s hard to say to what extent Russia can effectively manage the 
conflicting aims of both its alliance and competition with its East Asian strategic partner, but the ambitions 
of China become clearer by the day. 
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